Incident Neutralisation takes a correlated problem from whatever you already run, gives it one ticket per root cause, remediates it only from a runbook your team wrote and your change process authorised, and then reads your monitoring for a full window to decide whether the service is actually back.
We do not correlate your events — your monitoring or your correlation tool already does that well. We start where that stops and carry the problem to a proven recovery.
One ticket per root cause. Symptoms attach to it; a cause that already has a ticket never gets a second one.
The specialist whose scope it is reads your monitoring, your logs and your configuration data, and shows the evidence.
A runbook from your catalogue, matching this cause on this class of asset — with its bounds and its backout.
Through the automation you already own, under an authorised change, checked again in the second before launch.
Your monitoring, across the whole window, against how the service looked before the incident.
Ticket, evidence, timings, refusals and the graph markers — the trail your service review and your auditors read.
A job that ends green says the job ran. A quiet console can mean the tool that would have told you is down. And the agent that performed the action is the last one who should vouch for it — so the verdict is computed from the readings, the same way every time, and it is kept.
Every signal stayed inside its pre-incident band for the whole window, and nothing covering the service is still firing.
A reading left the band, or an alert is still firing. The ticket stays open and the action is backed out through its declared backout.
A source could not be read, or the window has a hole in it. Said plainly, escalated — and never counted as an incident neutralised.
A generalist agent carries the blast radius of everything it could touch, so it can never be trusted with any of it. Each specialist has one scope, one set of runbooks and its own record.
Filesystems, memory, a service down or flapping, a log that filled a partition, a scheduled job that failed.
Services, system volumes, an update that left a device pending, a task that failed, a device that stopped reporting.
A guest down, a guest running with nobody home, contention on a host, a datastore filling, a replication that stopped.
Volumes and aggregates filling, quotas reached, snapshot reserve gone, a replication broken or lagging.
Crash loops, pods nothing can schedule, evictions, a rollout that never became ready, a node under pressure.
Read and explained, never changed: blocking, replication lag, slow statements, vacuum and backup state — as an argued recommendation.
Most of what pages you at 03:00 was visible on Thursday afternoon: a volume climbing to its ceiling, free space falling to a floor, a queue drifting, a pool of connections shrinking. The trend is measured and projected, never guessed — and a weak trend is reported as weak.
A class is one runbook, on one kind of asset, through one tool. Each climbs on its own verified record, and drops back on its first failure.
Reading your monitoring, owning the ticket, diagnosing and recording runs on its own from day one. Nothing changes on your estate.
Start with a person confirming each execution, and run unattended once that class of action has a verified-recovery record behind it.
One change, one approval, every time — until that class earns a pre-approved path of its own.
Recommended first: the projection and the runbook go to a person, and the record of what proved right is what opens the next step.
Nothing is autonomous by default, and nothing is capped forever: the verified record decides, and your change board signs off each promotion. One failed verification, one out-of-scope attempt or one incident traced to an action puts a class back, at once.
Priced per governed estate band, plus per incident neutralised with a verified recovery — never per alert, and never for a recovery we could not prove. Your own operations team runs it, in or out of hours. Remediations take the same governed path as every other production change through Change Guard; for the storage, backup and virtual-desktop loops behind them see agentic infrastructure operations, and for proof that a business service can be restored at all, Recovery Proof.